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the matter of trustees and powers of appointment."
It would seem, therefore, that unless a trustee who has a power of
appointment is limited in the exercise of that power by either an
ascertainable standard, a state statute as in New York, or by the
existence of co-holders of the power with substantial adverse interest,
the proceeds subject to that power will be taxable to the trustee's
estate. Thus, statutory and regulatory provisions must be strictly
adhered to or the risk of undesirable tax consequences can greatly
increase for the often unsuspecting holder of the power of appointment.

V.

LIFE INSURANCE PROCEEDS UNDER § 2042

The taxation of life insurance proceeds to the gross estate of an
insured decedent is provided for in § 2042 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954.' The provision is important because life insurance proceeds are often the greatest asset of an estate and are used in the
planning of both large and small estates. 2 Under § 2042, life insurance3 is taxable to an insured decedent's estate to the extent of the
amount receivable by the executor and the amount receivable by all
'o See Miller v. United States, 387 F.2d 866 (3d Cir. 1968); Strite v. McGinnes,
330 F.2d 234 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 836, rehearingdenied, 379 U.S. 910 (1964).

1 INT. REV. CODE

OF 1954,

§ 2042.

2 J. TRACHTMAN, ESTATE PLANNING 88 (rev. ed. 1968). The prevalence of life insur-

ance is reflected by the fact that Americans were covered by $1,628 billion of life
insurance in 1972. The trend in the past indicates continued growth in the amount of
life insurance and the number of people insured in the future. See INSTITUTE OF LIFE
INSURANCE, LIFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK 1973 at 8, 11 (1973).
3 The provisions of § 2042 fail to include any definition of "life insurance." The
absence of a definition is important in connection with § 2039 concerning annuities
because § 2039 specifically excludes life insurance from taxation under that section.
It is possible that benefits received under a non-qualified plan could be considered life
insurance, yet if the decedent possessed no incidents of ownership in the benefits then
the proceeds might not be taxed under § 2042. Cf. All v. McCobb, 321 F.2d 633 (2d
Cir. 1963). Judicial decisions have stated that "life insurance" includes accidental
death benefits, annuity and life insurance combinations, group insurance, health insurance, death benefits in addition to retirement benefits, stock exchange benefits, and
war risk insurance among others. There are also many benefits normally considered
insurance that are not "life insurance" within the meaning of § 2042. See C. LOWNDES,
R. KRAMER, AND J. McCORD, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFr TAXES § 13.12 (3d ed. 1974).
One treasury regulation gives a very broad and unhelpful definition of "life insurance."
Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(a)(1) (1958), as amended, T.D. 7312, 39 F.R. 14948 (1974).
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other beneficiaries if the decedent possessed "incidents of ownership"
in the insurance policies under which the other beneficiaries received
payment.' The term "incidents of ownership" has proven troublesome since its inception in the Code.5 Among the 1974 decisions and
rulings concerning § 2042,1 were a series of cases that illustrate the
different estate tax results caused by the common law or community
property laws of the decedent's domicile.
A.

Common Law Property States and § 2042

In Terriberry v. United States7 an interpretation of the meaning
of "incidents of ownership" was offered in regard to certain fiduciary
powers possessed by an insured decedent over his own life insurance
policies.
I See note 1 supra; C. LOWNDES, supra note 3, at §§ 13.5 and 13.6; 1 H. HARRIS,
HANDLING FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES §§ 66, 70, and 71 (J. Rasch rev. ed. 1972);
J. TRACHTMAN, supra note 2, at 89-90; 2 J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL GIFT AND ESTATE
TAXATION §§ 17.07 and 17.08 (1959, Supp. 1974); 2 R. RICE, FAMILY TAX PLANNING Ch.
19, §§ 21-22 (1974).
1 See C. LOWNDES, supra note 3, at § 13.7; 1 H. HARRIS, supra note 4, at § 72, J.
TRACHTMAN, supra note 4; J. MERTENS, supra note 4, at § 17.10; R. RICE, supra note 4,
at Ch. 19 § 25. The term "incidents of ownership" is not defined in § 2042. Treasury
regulations attempt to provide examples of the nature of incidents of ownership. Treas.
Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(1)-(6) (1958), as amended, T.D. 7312, 39 F.R. 14948 (1974). The
latest addition to the regulations concerning incidents of ownership appeared in 1974
as Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c) (6). This regulation concerns estate taxation of corporate
owned life insurance where the insured decedent was the sole or controlling stock-

holder. The regulation implements two basic changes. First, not only will incidents of
ownership be imputed to a sole stockholder of a corporation which holds an insurance
policy on the stockholder's life but also now such incidents of ownership will be attributed to a majority shareholder. The latter provision was earlier included in Rev. Rul
463, 1971-2 CuM. BULL. 333 but because of criticism was withdrawn by Rev. Rul. 167,
1972-1 CUM. BULL. 307 to allow further study. Trees. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(6) replaces
the majority shareholder provision into the regulations. Second, the regulation restricts
the thrust of the first change to situations where the proceeds are not payable to the
corporation. Thus, if the proceeds are payable to the corporation, even where the
proceeds are moving through the corporation to a third party, the incidents of ownership reserved to the corporation are not to be attributed the sole or controlling shareholder. Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(6) (1958), as amended, T.D. 7312, 39 F.R. 14948
(1974); see C. LOWNDES, supra note 5, at 333.
1 Other relatively important decisions handed down in 1974 concerned the relationship of § 2042 and the community property laws of certain states. See Kern v.
United States, notes 52-68 and accompanying text infra; Saia v. Commissioner, note
55 infra. An important addition to the regulations concerning incidents of ownership
in regard to sole and majority stockholders of a corporation which owns life insurance
policies on those stockholders was also given in 1974. See note 5 supra in regard to
Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-(1)(c)(6) as amended, T.D. 7312, 39 F.R. 14948 (1974).
1 74-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 13,002 at 85,759 (M.D. Fla. 1974).
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In Terriberry,the wife of the insured decedent had created a trust
composed of seven life insurance policies that she owned on the life
of her husband. According to certain provisions of Florida law it was
necessary to have co-trustees for such a trust to be valid. Therefore,
she made herself and her husband co-trustees. The trust was revocable and her husband was appointed co-trustee solely to ensure that
the trust was valid under Florida law. In an attempt to remove all
incidents of ownership from the husband, the trust included provisions stating that ownership of the policies would not vest in the
husband individually, but only in his fiduciary capacity; that the
husband was expressly prohibited from exercising any incidents of
ownership in his individual capacity; and that the husband was prohibited from any exercise of control over the trust. However, the trust
also provided that upon surrender or maturity of the insurance contracts either co-trustee could elect a settlement option based upon
the life of either the grantor or her husband, but the husband could
so only to the extent that ownership did not vest in him. Finally, the
grantor-wife reserved for herself the absolute right to revoke or amend
the trust at any time and to remove any trustee. These provisions
were all in effect at the time of decedent's death.8
The district court concluded that the insured decedent as cotrustee of the insurance trust did not possess sufficient incidents of
ownership to have the policies' proceeds included in his gross estate
for taxation purposes.' The decision in Terriberry is in apparent conflict with its own court of appeals' holding in Estate of Lumpkin v.
0
Commissioner,"
the recent decision in Rose v. United States," and a
treasury regulation directly on point. 2 Nonetheless, the court refuted
Terriberry v. United States, supra note 7 at 85759-60.
Id. at 85762-63.
10474 F.2d 1092 (5th Cir. 1973).
74-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 12,965, at 84,313 (E.D. La. 1973).
22 Treas. Reg. 20.2042-1(c)(2) and (4) (1958), states that:
(2) For purposes of this paragraph, the term "incidents of ownership" is not limited in its meaning to ownership of the policy in the
technical legal sense. Generally speaking, the term has reference to
the right of the insured or his estate to the economic benefits of the
policy. Thus, it includes the power to change the beneficiary, to surrender or cancel the policy, to assign the policy, to revoke an assignment, to pledge the policy for a loan, or to obtain from the insurer a
loan against the surrender value of the policy, etc. ...
(4) A decedent is considered to have an "incident of ownership"
in an insurance policy on his life held in trust if, under the terms of
the policy, the decedent (either alone or in conjunction with another
person or persons) has the power (as trustee or otherwise) to change
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the cited authorities using the reasoning of the Second Circuit's holdings in Estate of Skifter v. Commissioner'3 and the Sixth Circuit's
holding in Estate of Fruehaufv. Commissioner.4 Due to the holdings
in these latter two cases and the particular facts in Terriberry, the
court held the proceeds to be nonincludable in decedent's gross estate.
The Commissioner relied principally upon Treasury Regulation §
20.2042-1(c)(2) and (4) and the Rose decision to support the argument for inclusion of the insurance proceeds in decedent's gross estate." Incidents of ownership is defined in subsection (2) as generally
the right of the insured to the economic benefits of the insurance
policies and includes the power to change the beneficiary, to surrender or cancel the policy, to assign the policy, or to revoke an assignment. 6 Furthermore, under subsection (4) incidents of ownership includes the power as a trustee, alone or in conjunction with another,
"to change the beneficial ownership in the policy or its proceeds, or
the time or manner of enjoyment thereof, even though the decedent
has no beneficial interest in the trust."' 7 The insured decedent in
Terriberrypossessed none of the enumerated powers in subsection (2)
that would have given him economic benefit in the policies. He
merely possessed, as trustee, the power to elect a settlement option
upon surrender or maturity of the policies but only to the extent
ownership did not vest in him. However, this settlement option concerned the time that enjoyment of the proceeds of the policy would
occur, and the option could be made operative by the decedent's
action either alone or in conjunction with the co-trustee grantor."
the beneficial ownership in the policy or its proceeds, or the time or
manner of enjoyment thereof, even though the decedent has no beneficial interest in the trust. Moreover, assuming the decedent created the
trust, such a power may result in the inclusion in the decedent's gross
estate under section 2036 or 2038 of other property transferred by the
decedent to the trust if, for example, the decedent has the power to
surrender the insurance policy and if the income otherwise used to pay
premiums on the policy would become currently payable to a beneficiary of the trust in the event that the policy were surrendered.
Id.
13468 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1972).
" 427 F.2d 80 (6th Cir. 1970).
15Terriberry v. United States, supra note 7 at 85761. See notes 11 & 12 and
accompanying text supra.
16Treas. Reg. 20.2042-1(c)(2) (1958), as amended T.D. 7312, 39 F.R. 14948 (1974).
'7 Tress. Reg. 20.2042-1(c)(4) (1958), as amended T.D. 7312, 39 F.R. 14948 (1974);
see note 12 supra.
," See note 8 and accompanying text supra.
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Upon a literal reading of subsection (4), it would appear that the
insured decedent possessed incidents of ownership because of his
power as trustee, either alone or in conjunction with another, to
change the time of enjoyment of the insurance proceeds in the trust.
Therefore, the value of the insurance proceeds at decedent's death
were arguably taxable under § 2042(2).'"
In support of this contention, the Commissioner relied upon Rose.
The district court found the proceeds of life insurance policies in a
trust to be includable in the insured decedent's estate because of his
trustee powers. The decedent was sole trustee of an irrevocable trust
with the power to change beneficiaries, to surrender or cancel the
policies, to borrow on the policies, to convert the policies, and to
distribute the income of the trust when the beneficiaries attained a
prescribed age.2 0 As in Terriberry, the trust powers were not retained
by the insured decedent as settlor of a trust but rather the powers as
trustee were given to him. The court in Rose held the proceeds includable because the term incidents of ownership connotes "something
partial, minor, even fractional in its scope. It speaks more of possibility than of probability. ' 2' Under this broad test the powers that decedent possessed as trustee were deemed incidents of ownership in the
life insurance policy trust and the fact that decedent was given the
powers as trustee rather than having reserved them to himself was
deemed irrelevant for § 2042 purposes. 2 In reaching this result the
Rose court apparently considered as very persuasive authority Estate
of Lumpkin v. Commissioner." In Lumpkin, the Fifth Circuit held
the proceeds of an employer-procured insurance policy to be includable in the employee decedent's gross estate because the decedent
possessed the right to alter the time of insurance payments. Since the
court in Lumpkin had reasoned that mere possession of the powers
constituted incidents of ownership sufficient for inclusion of the proceeds, the district court in Rose held that the manner of possession
of the powers, whether by retention or receipt, was irrelevant.24
, Terriberry v. United States, supra note 7 at 8859-3.
Rose v. United States, supra note 11 at 84,314.
2IId.

See note 24 infra.
474 F.2d 1092 (5th Cir. 1973).
24 Estate of Lumpkin v. Commissioner, 474 F.2d at 1097. The issue of whether the
insured decedent possessed powers, bordering on incidents of ownership, over the
insurance policies, or more specifically over the trust in which the policies are being
held, as the result of a retention or a receipt of the powers is important to the various
decisions in question. In Lumpkin, the Fifth Circuit argued that it was the intent of
Congress to treat insurance under § 2042 in the same manner as other property is
12
23
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The court in Terriberry rejected these arguments offered by the
government and supported by Rose.5 The court countered the govtreated under the remaining estate tax sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
Id.; see S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 472 (1954). The court stated that the
power to alter the time and manner of enjoyment of property is generally subject to
taxation under § 2036 and § 2038. To support this statement, the Fifth Circuit referred
to Lober v. United States, 346 U.S. 335 (1953) and United States v. O'Malley, 383 U.S.
627 (1966). 474 F.2d at 1096. However, these Supreme Court decisions concerned
respectively the retained right to alter a trust, making the trust taxable to trustee
decedent's estate under the predecessor of § 2038, and the retained right to designate
the beneficiary who would enjoy the benefits of the insurance proceeds, making the
trust taxable to the trustee decedent's estate under § 2036. Lober v. United States,
341 U.S. at 337; United States v. O'Malley, 383 U.S. at 634. The court in Lumpkin
stated in regard to the inclusion of the proceeds in the non-trustee decedent's estate
that § 2042 was different from § 2036 and § 2038 in that the latter required an incomplete transfer of property, the retention of an interest in the property, while § 2042
required mere possession of an interest without regard to whether a transfer occurred.
474 F.2d at 1097. Thus despite the strong argument that the courts in both Lumpkin
and Rose make in support of the similarity between § 2042 and §§ 2036 and 2038, the
courts found a large disparity between them. Under § 2042, the courts argued an
insured decedent could either have retained or received the powers that are tantamount to incidents of ownership whereas under § 2036 and § 2038 such powers could
be taxable only if retained. These courts seek equality in the treatment of the property
but argue inequality in the final analysis. This disparity between acknowledged Congressional purpose and the courts' interpretation, along with the added feature of
fiduciary limitations on the exercise of such powers by a trustee, indicates why the
Rose and Lumpkin cases had no effect on the outcome of the Terriberrycase. See notes
25-48 accompanying text infra.
1 The court in Terriberryseemed to find that because the insured decedent was
a co-trustee instead of a sole trustee that fewer palpable incidents of ownership existed
in the decedent in Terriberrythan in the decedent in Rose. Terriberry v. United States,
at 85762. This distinction alone is clearly refuted by § 2042(2) and Treas. Reg. §
20.2042-1(c)(4) which both state that incidents of ownership can exist when exercisable
either alone or in conjunction with another person. See note 12 supra. A second questionable basis for the decision in Terriberrywas a distinction based on the fact that
the trust in Terriberry was revocable whereas the trust in Rose was irrevocable. The
court stated that because the settlor wife could revoke the trust at any time in her sole
discretion that the trust would be includable in her estate under § 2038. The inference
seemed to be that since the wife's taxable estate would include the value of the trust
because of her right to revoke the trust, the decedent possessed no incidents of ownership to make the value of the trust taxable to his estate. Id. Again, by itself this
argument lacks merit because there is no indication that sections of the estate tax law
are meant to be exclusive. In fact the indication is just the opposite. Several sections
of the Code might make property subject to estate tax. See C. LOWNDES, supra note 4,
at § 13.1.
There is no reason why such proceeds could not be taxable to successive estates,
first to the insured decedent's estate under § 2042 and then to the settlor wife's estate
under § 2038 when she died. If the insured decedent possessed incidents of ownership
at his death and his wife still retained the right to revoke the trust at her death, the
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ernment's reliance on Treasury Regulation § 20.2042-1(c) (2) and (4)
by citing cases which purportedly limited the scope of that regulation. The limitations countenanced the special nature of a trustee
and the trustee's fiduciary obligations. In Estate of Fruehauf v.
Commissioner,2 the Sixth Circuit confronted a similar factual situation to that of Terriberry.? The court of appeals overruled a Tax
Court decision 8 which established a rule of per se inclusion of insurance proceeds over which decedent possessed powers in a fiduciary
capacity. In Fruehauf, the court of appeals stated that where a decedent held powers over policies solely as a transferee in a fiduciary
capacity with no beneficial interest in the policies, the policies were
not includable in decedent's estate because the powers could not be
as a "substitute for testamentary disposition" by the dececonstrued
29
dent.
The rule in Fruehauf contains two separate concepts which when
combined prevent inclusion of the proceeds in decedent's gross estate
for taxation purposes. The first is that the decedent must hold the
policies in a fiduciary capacity with no beneficial interest in the policies. It is well established that a trustee is held to the highest degree
of responsibility and cannot use his position to benefit himself in his
individual capacity."0 Therefore, unless the terms of the trust authorize the insured decedent as trustee to exceed his normal fiduciary
value of the trust at the time of their respective deaths would be includable in their
respective gross estates. It may be inferred that the court offered these arguments as
part of an attempt to show less control by, and thereby fewer incidents of ownership
in, the insured decedent. However, they are subject to improper interpretation and
should be carefully dealt with in the proper context. The court offered more tenable
bases upon which to reach its decision. See notes 26-48 and accompany text infra.
427 F.2d 80 (6th Cir. 1970).
In Fruehauf, the insured decedent was co-trustee of a trust composed of six
insurance policies on his life applied for, paid for, and owned by his wife. The trust
provided that the husband was to receive income from the trust for his life, but was
specifically excluded from taking part in decisions setting the lifetime remittances that
he was to receive. The insured decedent was not precluded however from deciding with
other trustees when the insurance policies should be surrendered for cash value, used
as collateral for loans, and set aside for premium payments. 427 F.2d at 82.
Estate of Harry R. Fruehauf, 50 T.C. 915 (1968).
2 427 F.2d at 84. The Sixth Circuit cited prior decisions of the Tax Court itself
which held that even when decedent himself bought the policies and transferred them
to a trust, while retaining powers in a fiduciary capacity, that the policies were not
includable in decedent's gross estate because of the absence of sufficient incidents of
ownership. Id.; see Estate of Bert L. Fuchs, 47 T.C. 199, 204 (1966); Estate of Newcomb
Carlton, 34 T.C. 988, 996 (1960), rev'd on other grounds, 298 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1962).
427 F.2d at 86. See G. G. BOGERT AND G. T. BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES §
129 (2d ed. 1965); 2 A. Scorr, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 170.23 (3d ed. 1967).
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responsibility and thereby benefit himself as an individual,3 the
value of the policies should not be included in the insured decedent's
estate simply because of his control over the policies. The court in
Terriberry pointed to the denial of such extraordinary powers to the
insured decedent in that case. 2 As the court in Terriberry stated,
Fruehauf limited the scope of Treasury Regulation § 20.2042(1)(c)(2) .1 The economic benefit of the policies to the insured decedent, which results in the policies' inclusion in decedent's gross estate, does not arise for the decedent in the limited role of trustee with
its normal fiduciary restraints. 4
The second important part of the Fruehauf non-inclusion rationale is that in conjunction with being a trustee the insured decedent
should be the recipient of his powers as trustee.15 The court in
Terriberry peremptorily referred to this second element of the
Fruehauf holding in an apparent refutation of the government's reliance on Treasury Regulation § 20.2042-1(c)(4) and Rose v. United
States.3 1 Since the insured decedent in Terriberry did not reserve the
powers as trustee in himself but received the powers by designation
from his wife, the court stated that the policies were not includable
in decedent's estate. 37 The underlying rationale for the second element of the Fruehauf case, as used by the Terriberry court, is more
38
clearly explained in Estate of Skifter v. Commissioner.
In Skifter, the Second Circuit confronted facts similar to the situation in Terriberry. Decedent's wife created a life insurance trust
with the insured decedent as trustee. As trustee, the decedent possessed broad powers to sell, mortgage, or invest the proceeds from the
trust.3 9 The government contended that under Treasury Regulation
§ 20.2042-1(c)(4) decedent possessed incidents of ownership in the
policies because of his powers as trustee." Despite the fact that these
powers were greater than those possessed by the decedent in
31 427 F.2d at 86; see 2 A. Scorr, supra note 30, at § 170.9.
32 Terriberry v. United States, supra note 7, at 85761.
3 Id.

1, See notes 8 and 12, and accompanying text supra, specifically in reference to
Treas. REg. § 20.2042-1(c)(2).
' 427 F.2d at 86; see note 29 and accompanying text supra.
31 Terriberry v. United States, supra note 7, at 85761. See notes 12 & 15-24 and
accompanying text supra as to the government's argument for inclusion of the policies
in decedent's gross estate because of Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-2(c)(4) and Rose v. United
States.
31Terriberry v. United States, supra note 7, at 85761.
- 468 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1972).
31 Id. at 701.
11For text of Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(4), see note 12 supra.
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Terriberry,4' the court of appeals in Skifter held the policies to be
non-includable in the insured decedent's estate. The court stated
that as to trustees subsection (4) applied only to powers reserved by,
not to powers granted to, the decedent.2
To support this conclusion, the Second Circuit referred to § 2036
and § 2038 of the Code. As the courts in Lumpkin and Rose similarly
stated, the Skifter court reasoned that Congress intended insurance
to be treated under § 2042 like other property under other sections of
the Code. Therefore, reliance was placed upon § 2036 and § 2038 for
a source of analogous reasoning to determine whether the policies'
value at decedent's death should be included in his estate.4 3 Unlike
the Lumpkin and Rose decisions, however, the Second Circuit by way
of the analogy found the decedent's estate not to be burdened with
the policies.44 The Skifter court held that since § 2036 and § 2038
applied only to retained powers that, therefore, § 2042 similarly required the trustee powers to be retained by the insured decedent in
order to have taxable incidents of ownership. The distinction between
retention of powers and devolution of powers, has "considerable substance. 4 5 By reserving powers as trustee the taxpayer selects the
powers that he wishes to reserve to implement his scheme of testamentary disposition. On the other hand, where the powers have been
delegated, the trustee cannot be sure what powers he will possess
unless there is some underlying agreement with the settlorbeneficiary. Thus, it is difficult to construe the arrangement in
Skifter or Fruehauf as a substitute for testamentary disposition by
the insured decedent. 46
"

See note 8 and accompanying text supra.

42

468 F.2d at 705.

Section 2036 includes in the gross estate of a decedent any property subject to
decedent's retention of a life estate in the making of a transfer of such property. Section
2038 includes in decedent's gross estate any property transferred by the decedent over
which the decedent retains a right to revoke the transfer. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§
2036 and 2038.
" See note 24 and accompanying text supra for analysis of the intent of Congress
by the Fifth Circuit in Lumpkin.
' 468 F.2d at 703; see note 24 supra.
" Id. at 703-04. The court in Skifter acknowledged that the wording in § 2038,
"(without regard to when or from what source the decedent acquired such power),"
tended to support the government's position. However, the court stated that no court
ever held those words to apply to a "power other than one that the decedent created
at the time of the transfer in someone else and that later devolved upon him before
his death." Id. at 704. The court opined that the words added to § 2038 above were
meant only to restrict the holding of the Supreme Court in White v. Poor, 296 U.S. 98
(1935). There the decedent created an inter vivos trust, conferred power on the trustee
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In Terriberry, the reasoning of the Skifter case was applied in a
similar manner. The wife of the decedent was the settlor-beneficiary
of the life insurance trust and designated the insured decedent as
trustee with strictly limited powers.17 The decedent, therefore, was
granted the powers as trustee by the settlor-wife and did not retain
the powers himself. Nor were any extraordinary powers granted to
decedent as trustee so as to allow accrual of economic benefits to
himself. In fact, the powers were very limited. By this reasoning, the
court in Terriberry chose not to follow the rationale of Rose in its
reliance upon subsections (2) and (4) of regulation § 20.2042-1(c) to
include the policies' value in decedent's gross estate.48 Indeed, unlike
Rose, the court reasoned that Lumpkin was inapposite because the
decedent in that case held his powers in a non-fiduciary capacity and
was, therefore, free to exercise those powers as his personal desires
might dictate. 9
The ruling in Terriberry outlines several steps to avoid taxation
of insurance proceeds to the insured decedent's estate when the decedent is trustee of a life insurance trust. The insured must receive his
powers as trustee from a settlor other than himself. Moreover, the
powers given to the insured must not permit him to benefit himself
or his estate. A safer course, however, would be to avoid designating
the insured as trustee of the insurance trust all together. The latter
step would prevent the need for difficult interpretation by the courts
as to the sufficiency of incidents of ownership in the life insurance
policies. This would eliminate the uncertainty of taxation, provided
no other incidents of ownership exist. However, the Terriberry decision must be recognized as attesting to a significant distinction between powers by reservation and powers by grant in a trustee under
the incidents of ownership test of § 2042.
to terminate the trust, and subsequently decedent was appointed trustee. The court
in Skifter stated that the above addition to § 2038 applied only to the factual situation
of White v. Poor. 468 F.2d at 704.
"' As stated previously, the trustee powers of the insured decedent in Terriberry
were of more limited scope than those of the decedent in Skifter. See notes 8 & 41 and
accompanying text supra.
1 It should be noted that the limitation placed upon Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-2(c)(4)
by the decisions in Terriberry, Skifter, and Fruehauf is not an unusual procedure.
Since the Second Circuit specifically referred to the absence of sound support for
taxing a decedent under § 2042 where he is a trustee by grant, not by reservation, the
court could find that it was not bound by the regulation. See Smith v. Commissioner,
332 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1964); 2 R. RICE, supra note. 4, at 804 (Supp. Sept. 1974).
11Terriberry v. United States, supra note 7 at 85761.
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Community PropertyStates and § 2042

The treatment of life insurance proceeds under § 2042 in community property states0 is largely controlled by local community
property law." Although practitioners in common law states may
doubt the need to be familiar with the different treatment accorded
estate taxation of life insurance in the community property states,
the increasing geographical mobility in society will often confront the
practitioner with such estate planning problems.2 Therefore, the rule
limiting federal estate taxation according to the substantive law of
community property states is of importance to practitioners throughout the country.
In 1974, the Ninth Circuit considered the procedures necessary to
implement transmutation of community life insurance into the separate property of only one spouse.53 The court's decision in Kern v.
United States 4 dealt with an application of Washington state law to
an attempted removal of life insurance proceeds from a decedent
spouse's estate.
The wife of the insured decedent as applicant, and the decedent
as the proposed insured, signed an application for an insurance policy. The application included a standard provision that the proposed
insured agree that the policies applied for would be under the exclusive control and disposition of the applicant. The policy issued on this
application upon payments from community funds contained a typed
endorsement stating that the applicant was sole owner of the policy
and that neither the proposed insured nor his estate "shall have any
interest in the policy." Subsequently, another policy was issued in
the same manner but contained no typed provision excluding the
There are eight community property states: Arizona, California, Idaho, LouisAND S. JOHN-

iana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, and Washington. See J. DUKEMINIER
SON, FAMILY WEALTH TRANSACTIONS: WILLS, TRUSTS,

FUTURE INTERESTS, AND ESTATE

494 (1972) [hereinafter DUKEMINIER].
31 Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(b)(2) and (c)(5) (1958), as amended T.D. 7312, 39 F.R.
14948 (1974). This rule has been supported consistently by the courts as well. See Lang
v. Commissioner, 304 U.S. 264, 267 (1938); Scott v. Commissioner, 374 F.2d 154, 157
(9th Cir. 1967); Monroe v. United States, 301 F. Supp. 762, 767 (E.D. Wash. 1969).
12 See DUKEMINER, supra note 49, at 543-47.
53 In the ensuing discussions concerning community property it is necessary to
realize that the law varies from state to state in the community property system.
Therefore, what may be considered as true for one community property state may not
be true for another. For a basic discussion of the different treatment of life insurance
proceeds by the community property states and the effect on federal estate taxation
see 1 H..HARRIS, supra. note 4, at § 80.
491 F.2d 436 (9th Cir. 1974).
PLANNING.
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proposed insured's interest in the policy. After decedent's death, the
estate tax return prepared by his estate included one half of the
insurance proceeds of both policies in his gross estate apparently
based upon the fact that the policies were the community property
of the decedent and his wife. 5 A claim for a refund was filed thereafter seeking exclusion of all proceeds of the policies from decedent's
gross estate."
In the lower court's opinion, 57 the proceeds were not entitled to
total exclusion since the premium payments were from a community
bank account. The court concluded that the estate failed to bear the
burden of overcoming the presumption that the life insurance was
community property. If another instrument, stating that the property
was separate and not community property, had been executed, such
provision for the specific gift of the premiums would probably have
vested the policies as separate property in the surviving spouse. 58
Therefore, the lower court upheld inclusion of one half of the proceeds
in the insured decedent's estate.
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the lower court's decision was
reversed. The court of appeals agreed with the lower court that there
existed a strong presumption that property acquired during marriage
constituted community property.59 However, certain exceptions could
' To determine the amount of proceeds from life insurance to be included in a
decedent's estate it is necessary to determine in each case if decedent was married at
the time of the issuance of the life insurance, -if the premiums were paid from community or separate funds, and the identity of the insured and the beneficiary under
the policy. The various community property states apply different rules to the above
determinations as to when inclusion occurs and as to what amount shall be included.
See I H. HARRIS, supra note 4, at § 80; note 58 infra.
"' 491 F.2d at 438. In another community property decision in 1974, the Tax Court
followed Louisiana law in excluding all proceeds from the insured decedent's gross
estate where the decedent's spouse was the apparent owner-beneficiary of the policies.
As in Kern, the premium payments were made from community property. However,
because Louisiana law treats life insurance in a class by itself, Catalano v. United
States, 429 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1969), the court concluded that the policies did not fall
within the presumption that property was community property. Saia v. Commissioner,
61 T.C. No. 57, 2 FED. & EST. Ginr TAX REP. 8603 (Jan. 28, 1974).
" Kern v. United States, 72-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
12,826 (E.D. Wash. 1971).
Id. at 84,685.

5g491 F.2d at 438. Part of the reason for this strong presumption lies in the
codification of community property law in Washington. 26 R.C.W.A. §§ 16.010, 16.020,
and 16.030 (1961). See United States v. Overman, 424 F.2d 1142, 1144 (9th Cir. 1970),
where it is explained that the interest of each spouse in community property is an
intangible asset "giving each spouse an equal, present, and vested right in the marital
community with full rights of enjoyment." The "vested" interest of the surviving
spouse is the amount excluded from the decedent spouse's gross estate for taxation
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remove the property from inclusion in decedent's gross estate. To
claim an exemption under Washington law, it is necessary to show
that the receiving spouse acquired the property by gift, devise or
descent. Any such exception must overcome a strong presumption in
favor of community property and the burden of proof is upon the
party asserting that the property is separate from the community."
The proof must be clear, definite, and convincing to overcome the
presumption.'
Using the burden of proof standard, the Ninth Circuit agreed with
the district court that the second policy's standard provision in the
application" failed to show an intent to transmute the community
property into the wife's separate property. The provision in printed
form applied to any applicant and an insured without regard to their
marital status. This provision failed to meet the requirement of clear,
definite, and convincing evidence necessary to rebut the presump63
tion .
However, as to the typed provision in the first policy, 4 the court
of appeals disagreed with the lower court. The agreement placed all
incidents of ownership in the wife as sole owner and expressly precluded any interest in the policies by the insured or his estate. This
provision together with the testimony of the wife and the insurance
agency who sold the policies constituted clear, definite, and convincing evidence that the policy was intended to be the separate property
65
of the wife.
purposes. Parson v. United States, 460 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1972); Scott v.Commissioner,
374 F.2d 154 (9th Cir. 1967); see C. LOWNDES, supra note 3, at 338.
" 491 F.2d at 439; In re Estate of Smith, 73 Wash. 2d 629, 440 P.2d 179, 181 (1968);
Stokes v. McDowell, 70 Wash. 2d 694, 424 F.2d 910, 911 (1967); California-Western
States Life Ins. Co. v. Jarman, 29 Wash. 2d 98, 185 P.2d 494, 496 (1947).
66 491 F.2d at 439; see State v. Miller, 32 Wash. 2d 449, 201 P.2d 136, 141 (1948)
(clear and definite); in re Slocum's Estate, 83 Wash. 158, 145 P. 204, 205 (1915) (clear,
certain, and convincing).
62 See note 55 and accompanying text supra.
0 491 F.2d at 439.
6 See note 54 and accompanying text §upra.
491 F.2d at 439. The Ninth Circuit criticized the district court's reference to the
necessity of executing a separate document in order to establish sufficient proof of an
intent to designate the policies as separate property. The court of appeals stated there
was no support for that position in Washington law. Id.; see note 58 and accompanying
text supra. The district court listed five cases from Washington courts as support for
its decision without any discussion of those cases or their specific holdings. See Kern
v. United States, 72-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 12,826, at 84,685. Upon examination of those
five cases it is apparent that none expressed a position requiring a separate document
to be executed to effectuate the transmutation of community property into separate
property. The nearest any case came to expressing such an opinion was in Neely v.
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The holding in Kern promulgates an important distinction in the
manner in which evidence of transmutation of community life insurance into separate property can be conclusively manifested. Reliance
upon standard, printed-form provisions alone, applicable to any person, will fail to support an attempt to create separate life insurance
ownership. It is apparent after Kern that the particular parties as a
community must be referred to specifically in the provisions of an
insurance contract in the course of establishing a separate interest in
one of the parties. The provisions must state clearly that one spouse
possess all incidents of ownership and that neither the other spouse,
the insured spouse, nor his estate have any interests in the policies.
In this manner, the provisions of § 2042 shall not fall unexpectedly
upon the insured decedent's estate.
Lockton, 63 Wash. 2d 929, 389 P.2d 909 (1964). In that case the insured decedent
attempted to make someone other than his spouse the beneficiary of a life insurance
contract on his life. In judging the pre-eminence of either contract law or community
property law, the court argued that in the stated circumstances looking to the contract
of the insurance company to determine beneficiary considerations was not sound. The
insurance contract's provisions required less formality and forethought to execute than
a separate agreement. Therefore, because of the rationale behind community property
law, to provide a simple and certain method of disposing of property to protect the
surviving spouse's interest in the property, giving more credence to the terms of the
insurance contract would defeat the basic purpose of community property law. Id. at
911-12. Nevertheless, where as in Kern the spouse is the beneficiary of the insurance
contract and the contract simply adds a more complete disposition of benefits to that
spouse, the consideration behind the Neeley decision for not looking at the contract's
terms do not apply. There is no reason to demand a separate document when the
spouses themselves deliberately seek to alter their relative positions and rights in
regard to community property in favor of one spouse. Support for this position in these
circumstances was expressed long ago in Succession of Desforges, 135 La. 49, 62 So.
978, 981 (1914). Therefore, the court of appeals justifiably reversed the decision of the
district court and remanded the case for discussion of an issue not argued at the lower
level. Kern v. United States, 491 F.2d at 439-40.
The issue for remand concerned the applicability of a Washington statute, 48
R.C.W.A. § 18.440 (1961), that states in subsection (1) that policies made payable to
or for the benefit of the spouse of the insured shall, unless otherwise contrary to the
provisions of the insurance policy, inure to the separate use and benefit of the spouse.
The court of appeals, with apparent justification, believed that the statute's terms
might serve to exclude entirely the proceeds of both insurance policies from the estate
of the decedent.
The effect of a final determination that a policy's proceeds are not community
property would mean their complete exclusion from decedent's estate. When under
local law an assignment or other transaction results in the termination of community
property or conversion into separate property, the usual federal estate taxation rules
apply. See Catalano v. United States, 424 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1969); Bintliff v. United
States, 329 F. Supp. 1356 (E.D. Tex. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 462 F.2d 403 (5th
Cir. 1972). In this case, since the insured decedent possessed no incidents of ownership
in the property aside from the now refuted community property interest, his estate
would be free of taxation on the life insurance proceeds.

